文章摘要
黄  芳 1,2,宋  寒 1 ,郑循刚 2.质量兴农下考虑投资补贴的农产品供应链协调[J].广东农业科学,2019,46(4):156-164
质量兴农下考虑投资补贴的农产品供应链协调
Coordination of Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Consideration on Investment Subsidy Under the Strategy of Prospering Agriculture by Improving Quality
  
DOI:10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2019.04.022
中文关键词: 农产品供应链协调  质量提升  投资补贴  斯坦伯格博弈  库恩 - 塔克条件
英文关键词: coordination of agricultural product supply chain  quality improvement  investment subsidy  Stackelberg game  Kuhn-Tucker conditions
基金项目:国家社会科学基金(16CGL017);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJQN201801144)
作者单位
黄  芳 1,2,宋  寒 1 ,郑循刚 2 1. 重庆理工大学管理学院重庆 4000542. 四川农业大学管理学院四川 成都 611130 
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中文摘要:
      【目的】针对农产品供应链质量管理中的双重边际化、质量投资不足问题,探讨了公司作为供应 链主导方、农户决定农产品质量水平情况下,农户、公司构成的二级农产品供应链的质量协调问题。【方法】 运用动态博弈理论分析了集中决策下的供应链均衡结果,以及传统批发价契约下的供应链决策,在此基础上应 用博弈理论、最优化理论设计了质量投资补贴契约。【结果】批发价契约下供应链的最优质量水平、供应链总 利润均低于集中决策下的情形;投资补贴契约下,农产品最优质量水平等于集中决策下的质量水平,最优价格 与批发价正相关,最优质量、最优价格、公司利润均大于传统批发价契约下的均衡结果,农户利润则不变。研 究也发现,质量需求弹性越大、质量投资系数越小的农产品,采用投资补贴契约后、公司的利润提升越大。【结 论】投资补贴契约下的农产品供应链,相比批发价契约能够得到帕累托改进,同时农产品质量投资也将得到更 好的激励。
英文摘要:
      【Objective】Aiming at double marginalization and insufficient quality investment in the quality management of agricultural product supply chain, this paper probed into the quality coordination of the secondary agricultural product supply chain formed by the companies as the leading party of the supply chain and farmers households as the party that decides the quality level of agricultural products.【Method】 The equilibrium results of supply chain under the centralized decision and the supply chain decision under the traditional wholesale price contract were analyzed by dynamic game theory. On this basis, the quality investment subsidy contract was designed by using game theory and optimization theory. 【Result】It was found that both the optimal quality level and the total profit of the supply chain under the wholesale price contract were lower than those under the centralized decision. Under the investment subsidy contract, the optimal quality of agricultural products was equal to the quality under the centralized decision, the optimal price was positively correlated to wholesale price, and the optimal quality, optimal price, and the companys’profits were greater than the equilibrium results under wholesale price contract while the farmers’profits remained the same. It was also observed that, for the agricultural products with higher quality demand elasticity and lower quality investment coefficient, the higher profits could be gained by the company after adopting the investment subsidy contract.【Conclusion】 The supply chain of agricultural products under the investment subsidy contract can gain Pareto improvement compared with the wholesale price contract, and the investment in the quality of agricultural products will be better encouraged.
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