| 林朝朋，朱思明.两岸企业农产品冷链物流合作的动态演化博弈研究[J].广东农业科学,2015,42(1):174-176 |
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两岸企业农产品冷链物流合作的动态演化博弈研究 |
| Dynamic evolutionary games on the agricultural products cold chain logistics cooperation of enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan |
| 投稿时间：2014-10-13 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 两岸 农产品物流 冷链成本 动态演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词: Mainland and Taiwan agricultural products logistics cold chain cost dynamic evolutionary games |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 1702 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 后 ECFA 时代，随着两岸农产品物流量的快速增长，两岸企业农产品物流合作中基于冷链
成本的博弈问题日益突出。 运用动态演化博弈模型建立了两岸企业间基于冷链物流成本的
博弈关系，分析了企业冷链物流监控的稳定状态和影响因素。 研究结果表明，两岸企业在
农产品冷链物流合作中，当大陆企业的冷链物流成本低于未按冷链物流标准实施被查后的
惩罚费用与信用损失之和， 并且台湾企业的监控成本低于大陆企业未按冷链物流标准实施
被查出后的惩罚费用和给台湾企业带来的潜在损失之和时，两岸企业才会发生博弈关系。
当两岸企业都采取根据对方策略而进行调整的策略时，双方企业博弈会趋向于一定监控水
平和一定实施程度的稳定点。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| With the rapid growth of agricultural products logistics between Mainland and Taiwan at post-ECFA era,
the games on agricultural products logistics cooperation of enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan based on the cold
chain cost were increasingly outstanding. The dynamic evolutionary games were applied to build the game model of
enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan, as well as the stable state and influence factors of monitoring on the cold chain
cost between enterprises were analyzed. The results showed that the cooperation games between Mainland and Taiwan cold
chain enterprises would be brought when the cold chain cost of Mainland enterprise was lower than the sum of punishment
cost without implementing the cold chain standard and credit loss as well as the monitoring cost of Taiwan enterprise was
lower than the sum of punishment cost without implementing the cold chain standard for Mainland enterprise and potential
damage. The games would tend to a stable point with a fixed monitoring and implementing status when the Mainland and
Taiwan enterprises were both adopting adjust strategies according to each others strategies. |
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