| 韩 璐 1
，鲍海君 2，邓思琪 2，曾 新 2.征地冲突中多元利益主体决策行为的演化博弈模型与实证研究[J].广东农业科学,2018,45(12):131-136 |
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征地冲突中多元利益主体决策行为的演化博弈模型与实证研究 |
| Evolutionary game model and empirical study on decision-making behavior of multi-stakeholders in land acquisition conflict |
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| DOI：10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2018.12.022 |
| 中文关键词: 农村征地 演化博弈模型 利益相关者 高铁 |
| 英文关键词: rural land acquisition volutionary game model stakeholders high-speed rail |
| 基金项目:浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目（18NDJC142YB）；国家社会科学基金（16ZDA020）；国家自然
科学基金（41371187，71704152）；浙江省自然科学基金（LQ17G030005）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金
（16YJC630030） |
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| 摘要点击次数: 1901 |
| 全文下载次数: 718 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 立足于对农村征地冲突中不同利益诉求及其相互关系的研究，探讨当前农村征地制度和征地
过程中多方利益的冲突与协调问题。运用演化博弈论和实证分析法对高铁公共交通基础设施建设项目征地
案例进行分析，厘清了中央政府、地方政府与失地农民三者两两之间演化博弈的关系与过程，研究表明：（1）
中央政府与地方政府、失地农民的博弈中，主要考虑中央政府在地方政府违规时监管尽力的收益、中央政
府实施介入的成本、监管失效带来的损失等因素；（2）地方政府与中央政府、失地农民的博弈中，主要
考虑地方政府选择违规的额外收益、中央政府对地方政府违规的罚款等因素；（3）失地农民与中央政府、
地方政府的博弈中，主要考虑失地农民上访的概率、失地农民上访的成本等因素。并提出化解征地冲突可
以从完善土地征用制度、规范征地程序、加强中央政府的监督职能和地方政府的权利管制及合理处理争议
等政策建议。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| In this paper, the conflicts and coordination of the interests of multiple participants in the current
rural land acquisition system and land acquisition process were discussed, based on the study of different interest
demands and their mutual relations in rural land acquisition conflicts. The relationship and process of the evolutionary
game among the central government, local government and the landless peasants were clarified, using evolutionary
game theory and empirical analysis to analyze the case of land acquisition of public transportation infrastructure
construction projects taking high-speed rail as an example. The results showed that: (1) In the game among the central
government, local governments and landless peasants, factors such as the central government's revenue in monitoring local government violations, the cost of central government’ intervention and the loss due to regulatory failure should
be mainly considered. (2) In the game among local governments, the central government and landless peasants, factors
such as the extra profits of local governments’ violation and the central government fines for local governments’
violation should be mainly considered. (3) In the game among landless peasants, the central government and local
governments, the probability and cost of landless peasants' petition should be considered. Moreover, in the paper
it was put forward that the conflicts over land and acquisition could be resolved from four aspects: perfecting land
expropriation institution, strengthening the supervision function of central government, the right control of local
government and reasonably handling disputes. |
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