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| Dynamic evolutionary games on the agricultural products cold chain logistics cooperation of enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan |
| Received:October 13, 2014 |
| DOI： |
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| Abstract: |
| With the rapid growth of agricultural products logistics between Mainland and Taiwan at post-ECFA era,
the games on agricultural products logistics cooperation of enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan based on the cold
chain cost were increasingly outstanding. The dynamic evolutionary games were applied to build the game model of
enterprises between Mainland and Taiwan, as well as the stable state and influence factors of monitoring on the cold chain
cost between enterprises were analyzed. The results showed that the cooperation games between Mainland and Taiwan cold
chain enterprises would be brought when the cold chain cost of Mainland enterprise was lower than the sum of punishment
cost without implementing the cold chain standard and credit loss as well as the monitoring cost of Taiwan enterprise was
lower than the sum of punishment cost without implementing the cold chain standard for Mainland enterprise and potential
damage. The games would tend to a stable point with a fixed monitoring and implementing status when the Mainland and
Taiwan enterprises were both adopting adjust strategies according to each others strategies. |
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