| In this paper, the conflicts and coordination of the interests of multiple participants in the current
rural land acquisition system and land acquisition process were discussed, based on the study of different interest
demands and their mutual relations in rural land acquisition conflicts. The relationship and process of the evolutionary
game among the central government, local government and the landless peasants were clarified, using evolutionary
game theory and empirical analysis to analyze the case of land acquisition of public transportation infrastructure
construction projects taking high-speed rail as an example. The results showed that: (1) In the game among the central
government, local governments and landless peasants, factors such as the central government's revenue in monitoring local government violations, the cost of central government’ intervention and the loss due to regulatory failure should
be mainly considered. (2) In the game among local governments, the central government and landless peasants, factors
such as the extra profits of local governments’ violation and the central government fines for local governments’
violation should be mainly considered. (3) In the game among landless peasants, the central government and local
governments, the probability and cost of landless peasants' petition should be considered. Moreover, in the paper
it was put forward that the conflicts over land and acquisition could be resolved from four aspects: perfecting land
expropriation institution, strengthening the supervision function of central government, the right control of local
government and reasonably handling disputes. |
