| 【Objective】Aiming at double marginalization and insufficient quality investment in the quality
management of agricultural product supply chain, this paper probed into the quality coordination of the secondary
agricultural product supply chain formed by the companies as the leading party of the supply chain and farmers households
as the party that decides the quality level of agricultural products.【Method】 The equilibrium results of supply chain
under the centralized decision and the supply chain decision under the traditional wholesale price contract were analyzed
by dynamic game theory. On this basis, the quality investment subsidy contract was designed by using game theory and
optimization theory. 【Result】It was found that both the optimal quality level and the total profit of the supply chain under
the wholesale price contract were lower than those under the centralized decision. Under the investment subsidy contract,
the optimal quality of agricultural products was equal to the quality under the centralized decision, the optimal price was
positively correlated to wholesale price, and the optimal quality, optimal price, and the companys’profits were greater than
the equilibrium results under wholesale price contract while the farmers’profits remained the same. It was also observed
that, for the agricultural products with higher quality demand elasticity and lower quality investment coefficient, the higher
profits could be gained by the company after adopting the investment subsidy contract.【Conclusion】 The supply chain of agricultural products under the investment subsidy contract can gain Pareto improvement compared with the wholesale price
contract, and the investment in the quality of agricultural products will be better encouraged. |
