| 张 磊，李伟锋，方 伟，谭银清.合作博弈下农民专业合作社盈余分配方式的演变[J].广东农业科学,2022,49(7):155-162 |
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合作博弈下农民专业合作社盈余分配方式的演变 |
| Evolution of Surplus Distribution Mode of Farmers’Professional Cooperatives Under Cooperative Game—From the Perspective of Life Cycle |
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| DOI：10.16768/j.issn.1004-874X.2022.07.019 |
| 中文关键词: 农民专业合作社 异质性 合作博弈 激励相容 盈余分配 生命周期 |
| 英文关键词: farmers’professional cooperative heterogeneity cooperative game incentive-compatibility surplus distribution life cycle |
| 基金项目:广东省哲学社会科学青年项目（GD19YYJ07）；广东省自科基金面上项目（2021A1515012218）；广东省农业科学院院长基金重点项目（202003）；广东省农业科学院人才项目“青年导师制”（R2019QD-020） |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 【目的】阐明我国农民专业合作社成员异质性、合作博弈与合作社盈余分配方式的演变机理，基
于生命周期视角对合作社在初创期、成长期、成熟期与衰退期 4 个阶段，“资本”与“劳动”地位变化如何影
响合作社剩余索取权的配置进行理论与实证分析。【方法】以博弈论为工具，讨论了异质性条件下合作社在生
命周期不同阶段盈余分配制度的演变 , 并利用重庆市奉节县铁佛脐橙种植股份合作社的典型案例进行实证分析。
【结果】明晰了我国农民合作社盈余分配机制的演化机理，合作社盈余分配方式与合作博弈力量呈同方向变动，
当合作社由出资方的“大农”占据主导地位时，合作社倾向于按股为主分配盈余，反之则倾向于有利于“小农”
的按劳动投入（即交易量）分配。【结论】合作社在生命周期不同阶段，随着经营目标的改变，“资本”与“劳
动”的地位会发生相应变化，由此带来盈余分配方式的演变；在政策启示上也表明，基于生命周期视角的包容性、
平衡性、协同性支持合作社激励相容发展，不仅能够较好地弥合合作社异化带来的不确定性，也为新时期我国
农村合作经济组织高质量发展提供有价值的思路和探索。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| 【Objective】In order to clarify the evolution mechanism of member heterogeneity, cooperative game
and surplus distribution mode of farmers’professional cooperatives in China, cooperatives are divided into four stages:
start-up period, growth period, maturity period and recession period based on the perspective of life cycle. It also makes a
theoretical and empirical analysis on how the changes in the status of“capital”and“labor”affect the allocation of surplus claims of cooperatives.【Method】With game theory as a tool, the evolution of surplus distribution system at different stages of
cooperative life cycle under the condition of heterogeneity is discussed. The typical case of Tiefo Navel Orange Planting Stock
Cooperative in Fengjie County of Chongqing is used for empirical analysis.【Result】The evolution mechanism of the surplus
distribution mechanism of farmers’cooperatives in China is clarified. The way of surplus distribution of cooperatives changes in
the same direction as the power of cooperative game. When the cooperative is dominated by the“big farmers”of the investors,
the cooperative tends to distribute the surplus mainly by shares. On the contrary, it tends to be distributed according to labor
input (i.e. trading volume) in favor of“small farmers”.【Conclusion】At different stages of the life cycle of cooperatives, with
the change of cooperative business objectives, the status of“capital”and“labor”will change accordingly. This has led to the
evolution of surplus distribution. In terms of policy enlightenment, it also shows that inclusiveness, balance and synergy based
on the perspective of life cycle support the incentive and compatible development of cooperatives. It can not only better bridge
the uncertainty caused by the alienation of cooperatives, but also provide valuable ideas and exploration for the high-quality
development of rural cooperative economic organizations in the new era. |
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